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A growing empirical has analysed the historical relationship be-
tween infrastructure and output in South Africa, finding a broadly 
positive effect that operates largely via the marginal productivity of 
private capital. We extend this literature by investigating the relation-
ship between infrastructure, output and institutional quality: protec-
tion of property rights, political fractionation and political and eco-
nomic risk. We develop a model in the spirit of Barro (1990), which 
predicts a nonlinear relationship between infrastructure and output 
(positive at low levels of infrastructure and subsequently negative) 
and a positive effect of institutional capital on both output and the 
response of output to changes in infrastructure stock. We test this 
model using both univariate and multivariate cointegration models, 
finding support for the predicted nonlinear relationship and mixed ev-
idence with respect to all other predictions. We conclude that the 
omission of institutional measures may have biased prior empirical 
analyses but that we are unable to generate more robust findings with 
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The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGI-SA) 
has identified infrastructure spending in South Africa as a key driver of sus-
tained economic growth and job creation, stating that: 
"Backlogs in infrastructure and investment, and in some cases 
market structures that do not encourage competition, make the 
price of moving goods and conveying services over distance higher 
than it should be. Deficiencies in logistics are keenly felt in a 
country of South Africa's size, with considerable concentration of 
production inland, and which is some distance from the major 
industrial markets (South Africa, 2007a)." 
Reflecting this emphasis, the National Treasury has allocated R416 billion to 
spending on infrastructure development and maintenance, broadly defined, 
in the current three-year budget cycle (South Africa, 2007b). This follows a 
period from 1976 to 2002 in which annual infrastructure investment fell from 
8.1 % to 2.6% of GDP, with per capita per annum expenditure falling from 
R1268 to R356 (Fedderke and Bogetic, 2006a). 
The relationship between infrastructure and economic growth is thus of cru-
cial importance to South Africa and to sub-Saharan Africa more broadly. 
This relationship has been explored in a number of recent papers using time-
series and panel data on the South African economy (Perkins, et al, 2005; 
Fedderke, et al, 2006; Fedderke and BogetiC, 2006 and Kularatne, 2006). At 
the same time, another strand of the empirical literature on South African 
growth has examined the relationship between growth and institutions such 
as property rights and political risk (Fielding, 1997; Mariotti, 2002; Ku-
laratne, 2002 and Fedderke, 2004). 
These two strands of the literature have, however, proceeded largely in iso-
lation in South Africa. In contrast, the international academic and policy 











of the relationship between infrastructure spending and output: both Guasch 
(2004) and Kessides (2004) emphasize that institutions playa crucial role in 
determining the type of infrastructure projects undertaken and the ability 
of the private sector to take advantage of those projects. Only Fedderke, et 
al (2006), and Kularatne (2006) briefly explore this three-way interaction in 
the South African context. 
This paper aims to determine the implications for the infrastructure-output 
relationship of taking explicit account of the institutional factors affecting 
both infrastructure and output. Analysis proceeds through the development 
of a theoretical model in the spirit of Barro (1990) and the testing of this 
model against time-series data on the South African economy between 1960 
and 2006. 
Section 2 very briefly reviews the most relevant international and South 
African literature. Section 3 develops the theoretical model of the interaction 
of infrastructure, institutions and economic growth and section 4 introduces 
the data used to test these models. Section 5 reports the estimation results, 
with subsections 5.2 and 5.3 reporting the univariate and multivariate esti-
mates, respectively. Section 6 concludes. The appendix provides more details 
on construction of the institutional variables. 
2 Literature Review 
A comprehensive review of the existing literature on infrastructure and out-
put falls beyond the scope of this paper, so comment is limited to a brief, 
approximately chronological discussion of the development of key interna-
tional and domestic findings. Emphasis is placed on understanding the way 
in which this literature might be limited by methodological considerations 
and specifically by its omission of the potential role of institutions in shap-











the South African infrastructure-output literature see Fedderke and Garlick 
(2007). 
Empirical investigation of the relationship between infrastructure and output 
dates back to the late 1980s (Aschauer, 1989a; Aschauer, 1989b; Aschauer, 
1989c; Munnell, 1990), with most studies focusing only on the developed 
world and finding significant, positive growth elasticities of infrastructure 
spending. The South African literature followed suit, finding growth elas-
ticities of infrastructure spending between 0.17 and 0.33 (Abedian and Van 
Seventer, 1995; Coetzee and Le Roux, 1998; Development Bank of South-
ern Africa, 1998). These initial findings were, however, strongly criticised in 
subsequent literature on numerous fronts: 
• applying least-squares estimators to non-stationary time series; 
• assuming a linear relationship between infrastructure and output; 
• ignoring the possibility of an indirect relationship between infrastruc-
ture and output via, for example, changes in the marginal productivity 
of capital or labour; 
• failing to control for other determinants of economic growth; 
• employing highly aggregated data which ignored region-, sector- and 
infrastructure-specific characteristics; and 
• failing to control for the possibility of simultaneity between infrastruc-
ture and output. 
These problems are reported in more depth in Fedderke and Bogetic (2006), 
Fedderke and Garlick (2007) and Gramlich (1994). The latter deals with the 
international literature and the former two with the South African literature. 
Subsequent research has attempted to address specifically these early prob-
lems and has produced a significantly more nuanced picture of the relation-











South African literature on two levels. Firstly, the paper used both finan-
cial (investment during a period or accumulated capital stock) and physical 
(kilometres of road, number of fixed-line telephones, number of passengers 
departing from an airport during a period, etc.) measures of infrastruc-
ture. While both are "noisy" measures of actual investment - the former 
approach implicitly assumes a uniform "infrastructure output" for each unit 
of currency invested and the latter approach measures only the quantity of 
infrastructure, not the quality - this was nonetheless an improvement on the 
early literature's sole focus on financial measures. Secondly, they specifically 
examined the direction of association between infrastructure and output. 
Using a PSS ARDL estimation, they find that aggregate infrastructure ex-
penditure, aggregate infrastructure capital stock and total road length drive 
gross domestic product, while other physical measures of output are either 
driven by or ambiguously related to GDP. 
This finding is replicated by Fedderke, et ai, (2006) who also use a Johansen 
VECM structure to estimate the long-run relationship between infrastructure 
and output. They conclude that there is a significant positive relationship 
but that it is indirect, operating through the relationship between infrastruc-
ture stock and fixed capital stock (elasticity 1.37) and between fixed capital 
stock and GDP (elasticity 0.06). Their findings are, however, highly sensitive 
to the use of different physical measures of infrastructure stock. 
These papers all focused exclusively on the relationship between output and 
physical infrastucture, which includes transport, communications and power 
generation infrastructure. The relationship between output and social infras-
tructure, which includes health, education and sanitation infrastructure,l has 
received little attention in the South African literature. A notable exception 
is Kularatne (2006), which explores the interaction between social infras-
tructure, physical infrastructure, private investment and gross value added. 
IThis distinction is widely used in the literature, both empirical and theoretical. The 
distinction is not always, however, entirely clear: water supply and sanitation infrastruc-











Using a PSS ARDL model, he finds that social infrastructure drives all of 
the other three variables but that the direction of association between the 
other variables is ambiguous. A VECM structure estimates a value-added 
elasticity of 0.06 with respect to social infrastructure investment and of 2.5 
with respect to private investment (which in turn has an elasticity of 0.02 
with respect to physical infrastructure investment). 
Several other papers examine the indirect relationship between infrastructure 
and output through the role of infrastructure in driving other determinants 
of economic growth. Fedderke and Bogetic (2006) focus on the relationship 
between infrastructure and both labour and total factor productivity, using 
instrumental variables to take cognisance of the possibility of simultaneity 
between infrastructure and output. They find that aggregate infrastructure 
investment and stock impact on labour productivity with elasticities 0.2 and 
0.19, respectively, and impact total factor productivity with elasticties of 0.04 
and approximately zero. These results are qualitatively robust to replacing 
financial measures of infrastructure with physical measures, though the elas-
ticities are substantially larger for measures of the extensiveness of the road 
and rail networks and substantially smaller for other forms of physical in-
frastructure. 
Alves and Edwards (2005) and Edwards and Johnny (2006) examine the 
relationship between infrastructure and export performance. PSS ARDL 
analysis suggests that infrastructure stock drives export performance, rather 
than vice versa and firm-level surveys indicate that infrastructure capacity 
positively impacts on firms' decisions to enter the export market. 
The bulk of these results, however, do not take cognisance of the potential 
for institutional variables to affect the relationship between infrastructure 
and output. Fedderke, et al (2006), augment their baseline model to include 
measures of property rights and political instability and find that the direct 
relationship between infrastructure stock and GDP becomes positive and sig-











The indirect relationship between infrastructure and output via investment 
is largely unaffected. These results are, however, not robust to changes in 
the model specification. Kularatne (2006), controlling for political instabil-
ity, finds that only the indirect relationship between infrastructure and gross 
value added via investment is significant (investment elasticity of 0.02 with 
respect to infrastructure and GVA elasticity of 0.08 with respect to invest-
ment) for physical infrastructure but finds that social infrastructure impacts 
directly on GVA (elasticity 0.06). 
The international literature is surprisingly sparse in this area: many papers 
acknowledge the high a priori probability that the infrastructure-output re-
lationship is affected by institutions but there are few empirical tests of this 
hypothesis. Esfahani and Ramirez (2002), one exception to this pattern, ex-
periment with the inclusion of indicators of democracy and ethnolinguistic 
fractionation in a cross-country growth regression and find that the effect of 
these variables on the estimated relationship between output and telecom-
munications and power generation capital is ambiguous. 
3 Theory 
3.1 A simple growth model 
In line with several previous studies of infrastructure-output relationship in 
South Africa, we develop a growth model in the spirit of Barro (1990), which 
readily lends itself to the inclusion of multiple forms of capital. We assume a 
closed economy with no technological progress and no labour-leisure choice 
(i.e. inelastic labour supply). We assume a production function 
y = F(K) (1) 
where K is a vector of all forms of capital and the production function is 
increasing and concave in each individual argument (i.e. Fi > 0 and Fii < 0) 











per capita terms. We assume that K includes only one reproducible form 
of capital, private physical capital, which we denote as k. (Though it may 
include other, non-reproducible forms of capital.) We define y as output 
net of depreciation of private physical capital so that k is governed by the 
equation of motion 
k = F(K) - c. (2) 
Household preferences are given by 
u = roo e-pt (c1- e - 1) dt 
Jo 1- e (3) 
and we normalise the number of households in the economy to unity. 
Assuming that the representative household is a utility maximiser, it faces a 




. c 1-~ +).. [F(K)-c]. 
Treating c as a control variable and K as a vector of state variables, Pon-
tryagin's Maximum Principle yields the first-order conditions 
and 
As the second differential equation is potentially non-linear in some elements 
of K, we cannot directly obtain a closed form solution to this system of 
equations. Instead, we log-transform both sides of the first equation and 
then differentiate with respect to time, yielding 
-p-e.(~)=~. 











so the Euler equation for consumption is 
(4) 
As F has constant returns to scale in all its arguments, Fk is homogenous of 
degree zero (using Euler's formula) and so Fk(K) is a constant. Thus, the 
growth rate of consumption is constant and we denote it by Tll.2 
If K is a one-dimensional vector (i.e. private physical capital is the only form 
of capital in the economy), then the production function can be written as 
y = Ak 
and log-transforming both sides of this equation and differentiating with 
respect to time yields 
if A k 
Y = A + k' 
Under the assumption of no technological progress, A = 0 and so the growth 
rates of output and capital are equal. Given that the growth rate of con-
sumption is TIl, both output and capital must then also grow at the constant 
rate TIl. Thus, the economy is always in a steady state with constant growth 
of output, capital and consumption, all in per capita terms. Given an initial 
capital stock, we can use equations (1) and (2) to determine the complete 
time paths of all three variables. 
3.2 A model of infrastructure and growth 
We now adapt the model above to include a role for government expendi-
ture. We assume that government purchases output from the private sector 
to provide services that are qualitatively different from those provided by 
21n order to ensure positive but finite consumption growth we must impose the addi-











the private sector. 3 Given the focus of this paper, we assume that govern-
ment expenditure is devoted entirely to infrastructure spending and that the 
private sector provides no infrastructure services (the latter assumption is 
broadly consistent with South Africa's historical experience). In order to 
continue to use variables in per-capita terms, we must assume that there are 
no congestion effects on government expenditure. 
Production technology is now 
y = F(g, k) 
where 9 is infrastructure expenditure per capita. To clarify our exposition, 
we assume that production technology is Cobb-Douglas 
though the analysis holds for any constant elasticity of substitution produc-
tion technology (which includes linear and Leontief technology). We further 
assume that infrastructure expenditure is funded by a lump-sum income tax 
T = fl. which is constant through time, so that 9 and y grow at the same rate. 
y 
Assuming that the representative household's preferences are still given by 
equation (3), we can repeat the optimal control analysis above with the new 





With the assumption that T = fl. is constant, the growth rate of consump-
y 
tion is again constant in this specification and we denote it by T]2. Log-
transforming and time-differentiating the production function yields 
y 9 k 
- = a . - + (1 - a) . -
y 9 k 
3The conclusions of the model are identical if we allow government to own and produce 
capital, provided that it has the same rate of physical depreciation as private capital. 
However, this complicates the analysis of the model and so we limit our exposition to the 











and so, given the assumption that output and infrastructure expenditure 
grow at the same rate, output and capital stock also grow at the same rate, 
which must be constant and equal to TJ2. This augmented model is thus also 
in steady state at all times, though the growth rate of the per capita variables 
may differ from the steady state of the basic model. 
Using the fact that t = ~ . A· (tt, we can rewrite equation (5) as 
Differentiating this with respect to (g/y) and simplifying (recalling that a = 
8y g) . ld - . - Yle s 
8g y 
dTJ2 1 (g) a (Oy ) 
d(g/y) = e . A· k . og - 1 . (6) 
Thus, an increase in infrastructure expenditure relative to output raises the 
growth rate of per capita consumption if and only if ~ > 1. The non-linear 
nature of this relationship arises from the fact that infrastructure expendi-
ture affects output through two channels: it raises the marginal productivity 
of capital (as ~k = (1 - a) . A· (tt, which is increasing in g) and reduces 
disposable income by increasing the tax rate T. 
As ~~ = a . A . 0 r-a , ~~ is clearly falling in 9 and so the capital produc-
tivity effect outweighs the tax effect for low values of 9 relative to y and vice 
versa. We thus expect increases in fl to be initially growth-enhancing and 
y 
then, past a certain threshold, growth-retarding. 
3.3 A model of institutions, infrastructure and growth 
The final step in our theoretical analysis is the adaptation of the infrastructure-
augmented growth model above to include an institutional dimension. We 
specify a revised production function, maintaining the assumption of Cobb-
Douglas technology, 











where i is a measure of institutional capital, incorporating elements such 
as the protection of property rights and the accountability of the executive 
government. Using this production function, 
and 
oy ( 9 ) {3 ( i ) r ok = (1 - (3 - ,) . A· k . k 
so the marginal productivity of both private capital and infrastructure spend-
ing is increasing in the level of institutional capital. This specification cap-
tures the argument that more secure property rights and lower political in-
stability make capital more productive. Similarly, greater political account-
ability raises the probability of infrastructure spending being concentrated 
on projects that are genuinely useful to the private sector (instead of the 
"prestige" projects common to less democratic polities), raising the marginal 
productivity of government infrastructure spending. 
Maintaining the household preferences specified in equation (3) and repeating 
the optimal control analysis, we obtain the Euler equation 
Assuming that T is constant (i.e. 9 and y grow at the same rate) and that i 
and y grow at the same rate, the growth rate of consumption is again con-
stant and we denote it by r73. Furthermore, y, k, 9 and i also all grow at the 
same constant rate, r]3. This growth rate is clearly increasing in the level of 
institutional capital. 
Using the fact that * = ; . A· (*){3 (*)', we can rewrite equation (8) as 
ry3 ~ ~ ~ ~. [ (1-;) (1- (J - '1) m -1 m -pl 











Differentiating this with respect to (g/y) and simplifying (recalling that (3 = 
8y 9 d 9 9 A (g) (3 ( i ) "I) . ld - . - an - = ~. . - . - Yle s 8g y k y k k 
d1]3 1 (g)(3 (i)'Y lay 1 
d(g/y) = e . A· k . k ag - (1 - ,) . (9) 
This condition permits the same interpretation as that in the model without 
institutional capital: rising government expenditure enchances growth for 
low values of 9 relative to y (corresponding to high values of ~~) but retards 
growth past some level. 
The assumption of equal growth rates for i and y may be critiqued as overly 
restrictive, particularly given that this assumption is not standard in institu-
tional growth models. However, its sole role in the model is for expositional 
simplicity. If we allow the value of i to vary, the interpretation of 1]3 and y 
its response to a change in fl. are unchanged, though the magnitude of such 
y 
responses will vary with i. 
y 
3.4 Empirical specification 
The model above provides a number of empirical predictions that can be 
tested in a regression framework. Consider the model 
y = f(g,i,k,X) (10) 
where X is a (potentially empty) vector of appropriate control variables. The 
model above predicts that fk and fi are strictly positive and the sign of fg 
varies according to the level of fl: it is initially positive and then becomes 
y 
negative once fl rises past a certain point. 
y 
This non-linearity can be explored in the multivariate regression framework 
y = f(g, i, k, X) 













in which the model predicts fg < 0 and hg > 0, as increasing government ex-
penditure encourages investment in private capital by increasing the marginal 
product of private capital. 
Although rising private capital and rising institutional capital are both pre-
dicted to boost output, they are predicted to do so in different ways. An 
increase in private capital exerts a positive level effect on output but reduces 
its growth rate, as private capital enters negatively into equation (9). In con-
trast, an increase in institutional capital exerts both a positive level effect 
and a positive growth rate effect on output, as institutional capital enters 
positively into equation (9). 
Our model also predicts a potential role for interactions between infrastruc-
ture expenditure and institutional capital. Mechanically, institutional capital 
may exert a direct effect not only on the level and growth rate of output but 
also on the sign and magntiude of the infrastructure-output relationship, as 
8y ( 9 ) 1- j3 ( i ) 'Y 
8g = A . fJ· k . k 
Intuitively, we expect that the marginal productivity of infrastructure ex-
penditure will be higher in the presence of good institutions that direct the 
expenditure to socially useful projects and create a climate in which the pri-
vate sector is best able to make use of the infrastructure. 
In view of this observation, functional forms of models (10) and (12) in which 
all variables are additively separable may constitute a misspecification of the 
true growth process. Such forms estimate a single marginal productivity of 
infrastructure expenditure for all levels of institutional capital, as opposed 
to a marginal productivity that varies with the level of institutional capital. 
We thus estimate all of our regression models in additively separable form 











and with a multiplicative infrastructure-institution interaction term 
y = CX1 • i + CX2 • 9 + CX3 . i . 9 + F(k, X). 
In the former case, the estimated marginal productivity of infrastructure ex-
penditure is simply 0:2 , while in the latter case it is 0:2 + 0: 1 . i. 
4 Data 
The model above requires measures of output, capital stock, infrastructure 
and institutions. Per capita output (Y), private capital stock (K), physi-
cal infrastructure stock4 (PI), social infrastructure (SI) stock and aggregate 
infrastructure stock (I) are sourced from the South African Reserve Bank, 
all measured in constant 2000 prices. 5 We include institutional measures of 
property rights (PROP), political fractionation (FRAC) and risk (RISK). 
The first two measures are obtained from Fedderke, et al, (2001) and up-
dated to reflect the time period from 1997 to 2006. The third is obtained by 
splicing the indices developed by Fedderke, et al, (2001) and Fedderke and 
Pillay (2007), as these cover different time periods. (A detailed discussion 
on the updating and splicing processes is included in the appendix.) 
In addition to these core variables, we include measures of human capital (H) 
and the efficacy of the financial system (F). The latter is simply the ratio of 
the M3 money supply, measured at constant 2000 prices and obtained from 
the Reserve Bank, to output. The former is the ratio of highly-skilled and 
4The physical infrastructure stock measure includes stock held by both government 
and public sector corporations. 
5 Although the discussion above was phrased in terms of government expenditure on 
infrastructure services, we use a measure of government infrastructure stock in testing the 
model. This reflects the fact that the South African government has historically provided 
infrastructure services through investment in infrastructure stock, rather than purchasing 
infrastructure services from the private sector (Perkins, et ai, 2005). As noted above, the 











skilled to semi-skilled and unskilled workers sourced from Quantec Research. 
While all other data series were available from 1960 to 2006, the human cap-
ital measure is available only for the period 1970 to 2005.6 
On the basis of the Ermini-Hendry test (Banerjee, et ai, 1993) and Schwarz 
Bayesian criterion we log-transform the output, capital stock, infrastructure 
stock and human capital series. This facilitates comparison with prior South 
African studies in this field, almost all of which have used log-transformed 
data. Furthermore, as Banerjee, et al (1993), note, a cointegrating rela-
tionship between log-transformed variables implies a cointegrating relation-
ship between those variables in levels, but not vice versa. Our empirical 
results thus have greater generality when derived from log-transformed vari-
ables. The formal testing procedures reject, however, the hypothesis that 
log-transformation is appropriate for our measures of financial depth, prop-
erty rights, political fractionation and risk. 
Tables (1) and (2) report the results of the Phillips-Perron test sequence for 
the core variables for the period 1960 to 2006, with critical values obtained 
from Dickey and Fuller (1981). The data series are clearly not 1(0), though 
K, I, PI, SI and RISK are characterised by trend and drift components. Y, 
F, H, PROP and RISK are clearly 1(1) series, but the test sequence cannot 
reject the hypothesis that K, I, PI, SI and FRAC are 1(2) series - an econom-
ically implausible result. However, appropriate controls for structural breaks 
lead us to reject the hypothesis that these series are nonstationary in first 
differences. 7 We thus conclude that all of our variables are 1 (1). Repeating 
6No single measure of human capital stock in South Africa is available for 1960 - 2006. 
Prior analyses have largely relied on the data series on human capital stock provided by 
Fedderke, et al, (2000) but this is only available up until 1997. Attempts to splice the two 
series were unsuccessful, most likely because they are measuring fundamentally different 
conceptions of human capital: the Quantec data measure the employment in different 
skills categories and the Fedderke, et al, data measure formal school-leavillg qualifications. 
7K, I, PI alld SI in first differences appear to be characterised by structural breaks 
in the mid-1970s, corresponding to a period of rising political uncertainty and instability 











Series Model T,- cP3 Til- cPl T 
Y ADF(l) -2.148 6.797* -2.167 8.091* l.290 
K ADF(l) -2.948 10.629* -2.860 10.481* 0.677 
I ADF(2) -2.689 7.234* -2.810 7.438* 0.292 
PI ADF(2) -2.662 1l.038* -2.744 1l.148* 0.398 
SI ADF(l) -2.411 10.324* -2.833 9.947* -0.356 
H ADF(l) -0.184 2.709 -1.873 6.529* -1.097 
F ADF(O) -0.192 5.970 0.041 0.650 0.524 
PROP ADF(O) -l.591 2.788 -0.428 3.561 1.057 
FRAC ADF(l) -1.248 3.372 -l.747 3.185 -0.532 
RISK ADF(O) -2.925 10.889* -2.732 9.173* -l.817 
Table 1: Test statistics of the Phillips-Perron test sequence for one unit root, 
1960-2006. (Except F and H, 1970-2005.) * denotes significance at the 5% 
level. 
Series Model Tr cP3 Til- cPl T 
Y ADF(O) -3.923* 7.863* -4.002* 7.844* -2.728* 
K ADF(O) -0.697 2.773 -1.310 1.545 -0.984 
I ADF(O) -0.639 0.778 -1.302 0.615 -1.091 
PI ADF(O) -0.975 1.850 -1.406 1.415 -l.110 
SI ADF(O) -0.942 2.061 -1.492 l.817 -l.284 
H ADF(O) -3.515* 7.393* -3.220* 5.279* -l.117 
F ADF(O) -4.169* 8.698* -3.514* 5.348* -2.279* 
PROP ADF(O) -6.413* 7.305* -6.505* 7.303* -2.414 * 
FRAC ADF(O) -2.379 4.244 -2.326 3.434 -1.846 
RISK ADF(2) -6.057* 16.248* -4.131* 16.254* -4.930* 
Table 2: Test statistics of the Phillips-Perron test sequence for two unit roots, 












Figure 1: Log-tranformed per capita output, capital stock and physical and 
social infrastructure stock, 1960-2006. 
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the above analysis for Y, I, K, PI, SI, PROP, FRAC and RISK for the period 
1970 - 2005 produces consistent conclusions. 
Figure (1) shows the relationship between log-transformed per capita out-
put, capital stock and physical and social infrastructure stock for the period 
under investigation. The three series move together for much of the period, 
rising during the 1960s and 1970s, peaking between the late 1970s and early 
1980s and then falling. However, they later begin to diverge, with output 
rising from the early 1990s, while capital stock and infrastructure stock con-
tinued to fall for almost another decade. This graphical comparison provides 
a suggestion that capital and infrastructure stock can explain much of the 
historical variation in South African output but that this relationship begins 
to break down in recent years. 
Under the model developed above, this phenomenon might be explained by 
break in the late 19808. We employ both the innovational outlier and additive outlier 












Figure 2: Log-tranformed per capita output (right vertical axis) and institu-
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changing institutional climate. Figure (2) shows the relationship between 
log-transformed per capita output and a range of institutional measures: 
property rights, political fractionation and risk. The steady rise in property 
rights during the past two decades provides a candidate explanation for the 
apparent break-down of the historical relationship between output on the 
one hand and capital and infrastructure stock on the other. Our measures 
of risk and political fractionation, on the other hand, show relatively little 
variation (in the context of their historical magnitudes) during this period, 
suggesting that they may playa smaller role in driving output. 
5 Empirical results 
5.1 Methodology 
We employ two estimators in our empirical analysis: the univariate cointe-
grating autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) estimator developed by Pe-











tor error correction (VECM) estimator developed by Johansen (1988) and 
Johansen and Juselius (1992). This subsection briefly outlines the theory 
behind each estimator and then explains the process followed in implement-
ing the estimation. Subsections (5.2) and (5.3) then report and discuss the 
estimation results obtained using the ARDL and Johansen estimators, re-
spectively. 
We begin with a univariate regression model of the form 
J j 
}It = 1(L }It-j, L X t - j ) 
j=1 j=O 
where X is a vector of right-hand side variables. The ARDL estimator em-
ploys a linear structure for 1 and explicitly allows for the possibility that the 
variables of interest may be integrated of order zero or one. 
The ARDL technique proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we test the 
hypothesis that a long-run forcing relationship exists from X to Y, which 
entails estimating 
j J 
d}lt = 0: + j3 . T + I· }It-I + c5 • X t - 1 + L /1j . d}lt_j + L l/j . dXt - j + Et 
j=1 j=1 
where T is a time trend and the lag lengths J and J are chosen to render 
the errors Gaussian. Under the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship, 
I = c5 = o. Only if we reject this null hypothesis is it appropriate to proceed 
to the second step of the analysis, in which we estimate the coefficients of 
this long-run relationship. 
Here we estimate 
J j 
}It = 0: + j3 . T + L lj . }It-j + L c5j . Xt-jEt (13) 
j=1 j=O 
where the lag lengths J and j are chosen to render the errors Gaussian. The 
cointegrating relationships are then given by the equation 











where the coefficients are computed using the formulae 
a 
a = ----;---
1 "J ' - Dj=l /j 
In the following subsection we report these long-run coefficients directly. 
However, the ARDL estimator suffers from a number of limitations. Firstly, 
the estimation does not take into account the possibility of contemporaneous 
feedback from output to the right-hand side variables - it instead assumes 
that the right-hand side variables are all weakly exogenous. Secondly, it does 
not allow an explicit test of our model's prediction that the positive effect of 
infrastructure spending on output operates by raising the marginal produc-
tivity of capital. Finally, it presumes the existence of a single cointegrating 
relationship in the data, when in fact there may be several. The estimated 
cointegrating vector would then be a linear combination of the true cointe-
grating relationships, resulting in inefficient estimation. 
The multivariate VECM estimator at least in part addresses all of these 
limitations. We begin with an n-dimensional vector-autoregressive model 
(VAR) 
J 
Zt = L . Aj . Zt- j + 6 + Et 
j=l 
where the Z vector contains all n variables of interest, the 6 vector contains all 
relevant deterministic components and E is an error term rendered Gaussian 
by appropriate specification of the lag-length. This expression yields the 
system of difference equations 
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where fj is a n-dimensional vector of parameters capturing the short-run 
dynamics of the model and IT is an n x n matrix capturing the long-run 
relationship between the variables in Z. Under the null hypothesis that the 
model contains r cointegrating relationships 
IT = Ct· f31 
where Ct and f3 are n x r non-singular matrices. We can explicitly test for the 
value of r, though some of these tests have very low power in finite samples. 
Where r > 1, we need to impose restrictions on the matrix representing 
the cointegrating space, f3. Specifically, exact identification requires the im-
position of r linearly independent restrictions on each of the r cointegrating 
vectors, each of which is a column in the f3 matrix. The long-run relationships 
between the elements of Zt are then given by the elements of the restricted 
IT matrix and the short-run dynamics by the elements of the f matrix. 
Although the VECM estimator addresses many of the shortcomings of the 
ARDL estimator, it is not without limitations of its own. Perhaps most im-
portantly, estimating all of the elements of the Ct, f3 and r matrices is very 
expensive in terms of degrees of freedom and the approach is thus problem-
atic in small samples. Furthermore, aspects of the estimator's finite sample 
performance are unknown. 
In the current analysis, the identification requirements pose an additional 
challenge. Our model predicts that physical, infrastructural and institutional 
capital will all positively force output and should thus not be restricted in 
the f3 matrix. We therefore specify the cointegrating relationships 
all a12 y 
Ct21 Ct22 K 
a31 a32 . f31 . F IT· Zt-j+1 = 
H Ct41 Ct42 
a51 Ct52 INST 
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and INST and I are measures of institutional and infrastructural capital, 
respectively. This model builds off the specification in subsection (3.4) and 
incorporates the findings of Kularatne (2002, 2006) that financial depth af-
fects economic output primarily by encouraging capital accumulation while 
human capital accumulation affects economic output directly. While there 
is some evidence for certain choices of IN ST and I that three cointegrating 
relationships may be present, the sample size is sufficiently small that esti-
mating such a model would leave us with virtually no statistical power. 
The inclusion of human capital stock, H, however, limits our sample period 
to the period between 1970 and 2005. Compared to the ARDL analysis, this 
simultaneously reduces the number of observations and increases the number 
of parameters requiring estimation. The VECM estimation is thus charac-
terised by low power and the possibility of finite sample biases. In sum, both 
the ARDL and VECM estimators suffer from limitations in the context of 
our analysis, underlining the importance of employing both estimators and 
comparing their results. 
Our empirical analysis proceeds as follows. Given the range of available in-
stitutional and infrastructural measures, we estimate each model using phys-
ical infrastructure stock, social infrastructure stock, aggregate infrastructure 
stock and both physical and social infrastructure stock, using measures of 
property rights, fractionation and risk (giving 12 specifications). We then 
re-estimate each model with infrastructure-institution interactions and, for 
the ARDL estimator only,S with quadratic infrastructure terms, allowing for 
the non-linear relationship between infrastructure and output implied by our 
model. 
For each of these sets of variables, we: 











• test for the existence and direction of a long-run relationship 
• if such a relationship exists, test for the number of cointegrating rela-
tionships; and 
• estimate the long-run relationship(s) using the ARDL and/or VECM 
estimator(s), depending on the outcomes of the second test. 
Included variables Left-hand side variable 
Y K I PI SI PROP FRAC RISK 
Y, K, I, PROP 4.67* 2.06 1.90 3.25 
Y, K, I, FRAC 7.84* 2.27 3.46 2.48 
Y, K, I, RISK 2.23 3.09 2.31 7.63* 
Y, K, PI, PROP 4.67* 1.53 2.68 3.37 
Y, K, PI, FRAC 7.60* 1.89 4.64 0.27 
Y, K, PI, RISK 2.18 2.33 3.62 7.22* 
Y, K, SI, PROP 5.33* 5.58* 0.42 2.47 
Y, K, SI, FRAC 6.95* 3.02 2.30 4.24 
Y, K, SI, RISK 2.25 2.04 3.25 6.06* 
Table 3: Test results for the existence of a long-run relationship, 1960 - 2006. 
* denotes signifiance at the 5% level, using the critical values from Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (1995). 
Table (3) reports the results of first set of tests. We observe that the null hy-
pothesis that no long-run forcing relationship exists to Y from the relevant 
subset of right-hand side variables is rejected for almost all specifications. 
We can proceed to the second stage of the testing procedure outlined above. 
These results also provide support for the idea that the appropriate left-hand 
side variable in our estimation of the coefficients of the long-run relationship 
is per capita output. 9 We report only a selection of results, which are broadly 
9The tests also support the contention that risk may be the appropriate left-hand 
side variable. However, estimation of the long-run relationship with this specification 
yields economically nonsensical results, irrespective of whether we employ a univariate or 











representative of the entire set. 
Table (4) reports the results of the second set of tests. (Again, we report only 
a selection of results, which are broadly representative.)l0 The results are 
clearly highly sensitive to the choice of which deterministic components to in-
clude in the VAR and the trace and maximal eignenvalue statistics routinely 
suggest different conclusions. Where such conflicts arise we place greater 
weight on the structure suggested by trace statistic (which has better finite 
sample performance) and by the specifications including a trend component, 
given the high probability of underspecification typically present in growth 
models. 
Most specifications provide some support for the existence of either one or 
two cointegrating vectors, though a larger proportion of the specifications 
including interaction terms appear to contain at least three cointegrating 
vectors. However, these results should be interpreted with some degree of 
caution: the test structure is such that T cointegrating vectors are found only 
if the null hypothesis of T + 1 cointegrating vectors is rejected. Hence, the low 
power arising from our small sample introduces a systematic bias in favour 
of finding large numbers of cointegrating vectors. This is particularly perti-
nent for the specifications containing more variables (such as those including 
interactions) where power is particularly low. 
5.2 Univariate regression analysis 
Examining the results obtained under univariate estimation clearly reveal a 
high degree of sensitivity to changes in both specification and lag length. 
lOThe lag length in the underlying VAR used in these tests was chosen on the basis 
of the adjusted log-likelihood statistic and the Schwarz Bayesian criteria. These results 
are not reported here but they indicate that all models should be estimated with VAR 












Given the range of results obtained, we report only a selection of results. 
This sample is weighted toward the regression results that support the hy-
potheses developed in our theoretical model and so should be viewed as an 
upper bound on the extent to which the data cohere with the model's hy-
potheses. 
The findings in table (5) suggest that capital stock is significantly positively 
associated with economic output, with an estimated elasticity between 1.2 
and 1.9 (and an outlier of 2.5). This is broadly consistent with prior research 
in this area. However, the relationship between infrastructure stock and out-
put is negative in most specifications. Aggregate infrastructure stock enters 
negatively and significantly with a elasticity of approximately -1.3, which is 
larger than prior empirical findings. Physical infrastructure stock is also neg-
ative and significant, with an even larger (in absolute value) elasticity. When 
both physical and social infrastructure stock are included, the latter has a 
positive output elasticity but this is not always significant. Social infrastruc-
ture stock alone enters with a negative elasticity but this is not significant 
and is typically closer to zero than the coefficient on physical infrastructure. 
When both measures are included, the negative coefficient on physical in-
frastructure is larger (in absolute magnitude) but social infrastructure now 
has a positive impact on output. 
Although the the exact form of the output-infrastructure relationship is 
highly sensitive to specification changes, its negative sign is relatively ro-
bust. This may either reflect a genuine negative relationship between the 
two variables or may reflect the conflation of the (theoretically negative) di-
rect relationship and the (theoretically positive) indirect relationship via the 
marginal productivity of capital. The level of infrastructure investment may 
thus have exceeded its optimum and the resultant overinvestment may be 
reducing both output and the growth rate of output. This is not, however, 
consistent with prior findings, which have generally found that infrastructure 











Furthermore, the relationship between the institutional variables and eco-
nomic output is highly sensitive to specification changes. ':':-one of the three 
institutional variables are significant determinants of output across all spec-
ifications and the most robust finding is a positive relationship between risk 
and output, which defies economic explanation. There is also more evidence 
in support of a negative relationship between fractionation and output than 
a positive relationship. This provides moderate support to the hypothesis 
that greater political fractionation induces delays and rent-seeking into the 
policy-making process, with detrimental effects on government efficacy. This 
coefficient should, however, be interpreted with a high degree of caution, 
given that South Africa's legislature has historically enjoyed relatively little 
power to influence the executive branch of government and so fractionation 
may be a poor indicator of the extent to which government faces checks and 
balances in its formulation and execution of infrastructure policy. 
As a final note on these results, the absolute magnitude of the coefficients 
on the institutional variables is substantially smaller than the coefficients 
on physical capital and infrastructure capital, across all specifications. We 
cannot, however, use the magnitude of these coefficients to comment on the 
relative importance of different determinants of output, as the different series 
are measured on different scales and the institutional variables are in level 
form, whereas most other variables have been log-transformed. 
All of the specifications including a quadratic term in infrastructure stock 
produce highly economically implausible coefficient estimates with elastici-
ties routinely exceeding six in absolute value and so are not reported here. 
However, table (6) reports selected results obtained using infrastructure-
institution interaction terms, which differ from those in table (5) in several 
respects. 
Firstly, the coefficient on capital becomes more sensitive to specification 
changes: though it remains positive, its magnitude varies substantially across 











tural variables retain broadly the same signs and magnitudes as in the previ-
ous results but they are not significant in any specification. The institutional 
variables continue to be highly sensitive to specification changes and are sel-
dom significant, though the positive association between output and risk 
remains relatively robust. Insignificance of these estimates should, however, 
be treated with caution, as the model's relatively low power may lead to 
inappropriate underrejection of the null hypothesis of insignificance. 
The interaction terms themselves are almost invariably insignificant but their 
economic interpretation is intriguing. In the first column of table (6), for ex-
ample, both fractionation and physical infrastructure stock are estimated to 
reduce economic output but their interaction term raises output. This sug-
gests that infrastructure stock may be more effectively deployed to promote 
economic growth under a more fractionated polity. The magnitude of this 
interaction effect is not insubstantial: a rise in physical infrastructure stock is 
positively associated with economic output for values of fractionation greater 
than 6.8, which includes all observations in the sample. However, given the 
lack of precision of the estimates in this specification, such computations are 
highly speculative. 
The estimates obtained under ARDL estimation thus suggest four broad con-
clusions: physical capital is positively associated with output, infrastructure 
is negatively associated with output (though this finding is more true for 
physical than social infrastructure) with no plausible evidence of a quadratic 
relationship, institutional variables have relatively little explanatory power 
and interaction terms are potentially important components of our model. 
Above all these, however, is the conclusion that relatively few findings are 
robust across a range of specifications and that power limitations pose a 
substantial challenge to inference. Broadly speaking, the predictions of our 
model are not borne out by this modeling exercise: institutional factors do 
not appear to be important and the infrastructure-output relationship does 











5.3 Multivariate regression analysis 
For each of the specifications cited in subsection (5.1) we test for the number 
of cointegrating vectors using the trace and maximal eigenvalue statistics 
(with the addition of the financial depth and human capital measures we 
require for identification purposes). These estimates are broadly consistent 
with their equivalents in table (4) and so we do not report them separately,u 
On the basis of these tests we identify which specifications are amenable to 
the two-equation regression model proposed in subsection (3.4). 
Given the detail involved in fully interpreting a VECM, we discuss in depth 
only a small selection of multivariate models. These are again broadly rep-
resentative of the overall results, with a bias toward those indicating greater 
coherence of the data with the model and so should again be viewed as pro-
viding an informal upper bound of the coherence on the theory with the data. 
Table (7) reports the estimates for the model using physical infrastructure 
and risk as measures of infrastructure and institutions, respectively. Three 
specifications arc shown: (i) without an infrastructure-institution interaction 
term, (ii) with an interaction term and (iii) with an interaction term and the 
feedback channel from output to physical capital stock zero-restricted. The 
third specification illustrates the impact that overidentification has on many 
of the models: the overidentified model is characterised by more precise and 
more economically plausible coefficient estimates and, as we discuss below, 
is somewhat more stable than the just-identified model. The null hypothesis 
that the overidentification restriction is valid cannot be rejected at any stan-
dard level of significance. 
The estimated elasticity of output with respect to capital is consistently pos-
11 A notable exception to this trend is observed for the two interaction-augmented models 
we discuss below. An examination of table (4) may suggest that a two-equation specifi-
cation is inappropriate here. However, the test procedure supports the hypothesis of two 
cointegrating relationships for both of these sets of variables for the period 1970 to 2005 











itive across all three specification and the magnitude between 0.95 and 1.55 
is consistent with prior studies. However, the coefficient is not significant in 
any of the specifications, most likely reflecting the model's low power. There 
is also weak evidence suggesting that there is a positive feedback loop from 
output to physical capital stock. These results are consistent across a range 
of specifications, though the evidence in support of a positive feedback loop 
is stronger in most other specifications. 
Human capital is positively associated with output in all three models, though 
its coefficient is not robust across different specifications and is seldom sig-
nificant. More generally, both the sign and magnitude of this coefficient are 
highly sensitive to even minor specification changes and the balance of ev-
idence is in fact in favour of a negative relationship, which at first glance 
appears entirely at odds with mainstream growth theory and empirics. How-
ever, this apparent discrepancy can be explained by a careful consideration of 
the economic content of the human capital measure. Our data measure the 
ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in the economy, which is not an indicator 
of the supply human capital available to the economy, but rather an indicator 
of the relative employment of human capital (i.e. a measure of equilibrium 
in the market for skilled labour, rather than the supply side of that market). 
Furthermore, if dips in output are associated with a disproportionate loss of 
employment for unskilled workers, we may observe an increase in the ratio of 
skilled to unskilled employment during economic slowdowns. This hypothesis 
receives indicative support from the fact that the covariance of the two series 
is in fact -0.371. Unfortunately, the lack of alternative measures of human 
capital stock in South Africa leaves no avenue for avoiding this constraint. 
The consistently negative relationship between physical capital and financial 
depth (replicated in most other specifications) also warrants explanation. 
Our measure of financial depth (the ratio of M3 money supply to output) 
is vulnerable to a similar problem: a slowdown in output growth relative to 
money growth may well result in a disproportionate rise in observed finan-











series. The covariance of 0.477 does not directly support this hypothesis but 
this bivariate measure of association does not take into account the influence 
of other variables in the fully specified multivariate model and we suspect 
that the construction of the financial depth indicator is indeed problematic. 
Here again, we do not have ready access to any measures of financial depth 
that measure the actual capacity of the financial system, rather than some 
equilibrium in the money market. 
The estimated coefficients on physical infrastructure are representative of a 
pattern consistently found in almost all specifications: infrastructure posi-
tively affects capital stock and negatively affects output directly, with the 
indirect effect via capital accumulation dominating the direct effect. The in-
direct elasticities are 1.06, 1.15 and 0.86 in the first, second and third models, 
respectively, while the direct elasticities are -0.68, -1.05 and _0.66. 12 None of 
these differences are, however, statistically significant ,13 in view of the highly 
imprecise coefficient estimates in the first cointegrating vector in all three 
specifications. 
This pattern of competing direct and indirect effects is replicated for relation-
ship between risk and output. In contrast to the ARDL estimation results, 
which found a consistently positive relationship between risk and output, the 
VECM presents a considerably more nuanced picture. The typical pattern is 
that risk exerts a negative effect effect on physical capital stock (and hence a 
negative indirect effect on output) but a positive direct effect on output. The 
overall effect is invariably insignificant, which remains at odds with economic 
theory but is less controversial than the positive relationship found above. 
The inclusion of a risk-infrastructure interaction term produces intriguing 
results. 14 The direct effect of risk on output is now negative for any value of 
12We abstract away from the interaction terms at this stage of our discussion. 
13Using a X2 test for equality of the estimates. 
14We limit discussion in this paragraph to the overidentified model, given the extreme 











PI less than 9.92, which is true of the period prior to 1978 and after 1988. 
Furthermore, the direct effect of physical infrastructure on output is now pos-
itive for the early 1970s and from the mid-1980s onward. The latter finding 
suggests that physical infrastructure in fact has positive direct and indirect 
effects on output, provided that the economy is experiencing a sufficiently 
low level of risk that the private sector is able to make appropriate use of 
the available infrastructure. This is a potentially highly salient result, as it 
runs contrary to the finding of a negative or insignificant effect of physical 
infrastructure on output in all of the prior literature employing multivariate 
specifications and implies that their results may have been driven by simu-
latenously high levels of risk and infrastructure stock between between the 
mid 1970s and mid 1980s. 
However, this result should be interpreted with caution in view of some diag-
nostic checks on the stability of the estimated models. The bulk of the error 
correction terms in all three reported specifications are positive, implying 
that the model does not converge following a shock to either cointegrating 
vector and casting doubt on the stability of the model. In order to comment 
more confidently on the stability of the model, we must consider the impulse 
response functions, which map out the predicted response of the cointegrat-
ing vectors and the individual variables to shocks in either the cointegrating 
relationships or the variables themselves. Due to the number of graphs in-
volved in this analysis, we simply summarize the broad findings, rather than 
presenting the graphical evidence directly. 
In the specifications reported above, the cointegrating relationships them-
selves are stable to shocks of any form, though they routinely take up to two 
decades to converge back to their original values. The stability of the individ-
ual series varies: output, physical capital and infrastructure converge back 
to their original steady states, though output converges to a higher steady 
state following shocks to any of the institutional variables. This convergence 
again takes up to two decades. The institutional variables themselves are 











variables. These results are highly consistent across a range of specifications 
and this instability suggests that the empirical model is not an entirely ac-
curate depiction of the underlying data generating process. 
The second model we consider employs social infrastructure stock and prop-
erty rights as measures of infrastructure and institutions, respectively, and 
is also estimated with and without interaction terms. We again observe a 
positive elasticity of output with respect to physical capital and a positive 
feedback loop. Financial capital is now positively associated with physical 
capital (which is not representative of the bulk of the specifications) and the 
relationship between output and human capital differs across the two spec-
ifications. The positive indirect and negative direct relationship between 
infrastructure and output is again observed, with elasticities of 0.6 and -
0.37 in the first model and l.85 and -0.64 in the second. Xeither difference 
is, however, statistically significant, again refiecting the imprecision of the 
estimates. This contrasts with the only prior study of this relationship (Ku-
laratne, 2006), which found both the direct and indirect effects to be positive. 
The role of property rights in both cointegrating vectors is highly sensitive 
to specification changes and no clear pattern can be observed. With the 
inclusion of an interaction term, we see that property rights are positively 
associated with physical capital for all observed values of social infrastructure 
stock, though the effect is entirely insignificant, with an implied coefficient 
of 0.004 at the mean value of social infrastructure stock. The direct effect on 
output is overwhelmingly negative. These results are also, however, sensitive 
to specification changes. 
The interaction terms tells a more interesting story for role of social infras-
tructure stock. Up until 1990, the implied indirect effect is positive and the 
implied direct effect is negative. For all values of property rights observed 
after 1990, however, the signs are reversed. This is surprising and does 
nor accord with our expectation regarding the interaction between property 











rights to facilitate private sector use of rising social infrastructure stock and 
thereby encourage investment in physical capital. This may therefore reflect 
a structural change in the model itself in the early 1990s, corresponding to 
the fundamental change in the relationship between the economy and gov-
ernment at the end of the apartheid period. However, as this result is not 
replicated in other specifications, we cannot read too much into it. 
In interpreting these results we must bear in mind that these models suffer 
from the same stability problems noted above, casting doubt on the extent 
to which they cohere with the observed data and meaning that their output 
should be treated with a degree of caution. 
6 Conclusion 
Given the policy importance of the relationship between infrastructure and 
output in the current South African context, a clear academic understanding 
of this relationship is vital. While this relationship has been widely studied 
in recent years, with increasingly appropriate and sophisticated tools, little 
attention has been paid to its institutional dimension. This is perhaps sur-
prising, in view of the clear a priori case for the importance of this institution 
linkage. 
The contribution of this paper is, firstly, to provide a clear theoretical case 
for attending to the role of institutions when examining the infrastructure-
output relationship and, secondly, to test for the existence and form of such 
a role. Our model provides a number of clear-cut predictions concerning the 
nature of this relationship: institutional capital positively affects both output 
and the relationship between infrastructure and output. These predictions, 
however, receive mixed support when tested against the data. 











output relationship is highly sensitive to the inclusion of various measures of 
institutional capital: risk, fractionation and property rights. However, the 
relationship is also highly sensitive to the choice of measure and specification 
of the model - few results are robust across different specifications and our 
empirical models are routinely unstable. The identification of a stable and 
robust relationship, and the process of inference more broadly, is complicated 
by the short time series available and the limitations of some of the available 
measures. 
The central conclusion of our study is that institutions appear to be an 
important factor in shaping the infrastructure-output relationship, but the 
exact form of this relationship is not clear. Ultimately, however, we may be 
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The construction of the institutional indices of risk, property rights and po-
litical fractionation is an important component of our analysis. All three 
measures have their genesis in the indices developed by Fedderke, De Kadt 
and Luiz (2001), hereinafter "FDKL," but these are unfortunately available 
only until the late 1990s and thus needed to be updated for the purposes of 
this paper. 
8.1 Risk 
The FDKL index is explicitly an index of political risk and instability, con-
structed from data including prosecutions under apartheid-era "national se-
curity" legislation, bannings, police actions against "riots" and media cen-
sorships. Given South Africa's history during the period under investigation 
(1935 - 1997), it seems likely that the dimension of risk relevant to economic 
actors would be political in nature. 
In the past decade, however, political risk of the form measured by the FDKL 
index has been of little relevance to South Africa, as almost all of the measures 
included in the index have dropped to zero. The more relevant dimension of 
risk during this period has arguably been economic in nature, reflecting phe-
nomena such as currency fluctuations and commodity price movements. We 
therefore turn to the index developed by Fedderke and Pillay (2007), which 
uses deviations in bond yields from those predicted under the expectations 
hypothesis to capture investors' perceptions of overall risk levels in the South 
African economy. 
Figure (3) depicts the two indices. As the discussion above suggests, the 
FDKL index appears to underestimate risk substantially from early 1990s 
onward. Furthermore, movements in the two indices are almost identical 











Figure 3: Risk indices developed by Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (left vertical 
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feature of the economy at the time. This period of co-movement suggests an 
appropriate splicing approach is to normalise one index at some point during 
this period or for an average of several years during this period. We experi-
ment with several splicing schemes of this form and find that the conclusions 
of the paper are robust to changes in the splicing scheme. The results re-
ported above are those obtained normalising the Fedderke and Pillay index 
on the FDKL index in 1989. 
8.2 Property Rights 
The index of property rights used in FDKL measured the "right to possess, 
the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the capital, the right to 
security, the incident of transmissibility and liability to execution" of fixed 
(i.e. not intellectual) property, with an equal weighting attached to each 
component. The index was increasing in the degree of protection of property 
rights and bounded by 0 and 100. This was a de jure measure that was based 











ment of these rights. Reflecting the different legislation applied to different 
racial groups for much of the relevant period, the index was constructed by 
assigning a property rights measure for each racial group and then weighting 
these by population shares. 
The original index was the result of a three-step process in which (i) the 
relevant set of evaluation criteria were defined, a priori, (ii) two researchers 
independently constructed data series and (iii) the series were presented to a 
panel of South African social scientists and lawyers and modified on the basis 
of their input. The updating process, however, was significantly more con-
strained and thus followed a more modest process in which the third step was 
entirely omitted and the second step was conducted by only one researcher, 
rather than two operating independently. 
We therefore conducted a desktop survey of all legislation passed by the Na-
tional Assembly between 1996 and 2007 and identified those pieces of legis-
lation affecting the components of property rights listed above. We excluded 
legislation that affected the property rights only of convicted criminals (eg. 
the Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 1998 and its subsequent amend-
ments), and that constrained property owners' actions in ways not directly 
related to the control of their property (eg. the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act of 2003) and attached a low weighting to legislation af-
fecting a very small proportion of South Africa's fixed capital stock (eg. the 
Communal Land Rights Act of 2004) . 
8.3 Fractionation 
The FDKL index of fractionation measures the degree of concentration in 











where nj denotes the number of members of party j, N denotes the number 
of members of the legislature and J denotes the total number of parties in 
the legislature. This measure was updated for the period 1996 to 2006 (for 
the National Assembly only, not the National Council of Provinces, to ensure 












No C, No T Rst C, No T Unrst C, No T Unrst C, Rst T Unrst C, Unrst T 
Variables VAR length E'value Trace E'value Trace E'value Trace E'value Trace E'value Trace 
Y, K, PI, FRAC 2 1 2 0 2 0 1 1 3 1 2 
Y, K, PI, RISK 1 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 
Y, K, SI, PROP 1 4 4 2 3 3 2 3 4 2 3 
Y, K, SI, RISK 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Y, K, PI, SI, FRAC 1 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Y, K, I, PROP 2 3 4 0 3 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Y, K, I, FRAC 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 2 
Y, K, I, FRAC, I*FRAC 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 0 5 3 3 
Y, K, PI, FRAC, PI*FRAC 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 4 1 3 
Y, K, PI, RISK, PI*RISK 2 1 4 1 4 1 1 1 2 1 3 
Y, K, SI, PROP, SI*PROP 1 5 5 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
Y, K, SI, RISK, SI*RISK 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Table 4: Estimated number of cointegrating vectors, using the trace and maximal eigenvalue test statistics, 1960 -
2006. Columns correspond to different deterministic components (intercept, C, and trend, T) included in the VAR, 









Dep. Var. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Model ARDL(2,1 ,0,1) ARDL(2,1,0,0) ARDL(l,l,O,l) ARDL(2,0,0,0, 1) ARDL(1,0,0,1,2) ARDL(2,1,0,0) ARDL(2,1,0,1) 
K 1.586* 1.222* 1.180* 2.547* 1.853* 1.879* 1.699* 
(0.373) (0.619) (0.585) (0.480) (0.331) (0.725) (0.430) 
I -1.366* -1.283* 
(0.676) (0.455) 
PI -1.281 * -2.640* -1.759* 
(0.434) (0.507) (0.308) 
SI -0.622 -0.663 0.417* 0.234 
(0.453) (0.420) (0.199) (0.211 ) 
PROP 0.001 -0.005* -0.002 
0.001 (0.001) (0.001) 
FRAC -0.005* -0.006* -0.004 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
RISK 0.006 
(0.004) 
ECM -0.321 * -0.218 -0.247* -0.416* -0.486* -0.285* -0.311 * 
(0.111) (0.116) (0.113) (0.138) (0.142) (0.118) (0.112) 
Table 5: Results obtained under ARDL estimation including a constant and trend. Reported coefficients are for the 
long-run relationships. Standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 5% level. Sample period is 












Dep. Var. y y y y 
Model ARDL(l,l,O,l,O) ARDL(2,1,0,2,2) ARDL(l,l,O,O,l) ARDL(l,l,O,l,O) 
K 0.566 1.185* 0.479 2.0313* 





















ECM -0.409* -0.486 -0.245* -0.341 * 
(0.128) (0.135) (0.115) (0.127) 
Table 6: Results obtained under ARDL estimation including a constant and trend. Reported coefficients are for the 
long-run relationships. Standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 5% level. Sample period is 










Modell Model 2 Model 3 
Variable CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 
y 1 -0.345t 1 0.139 1 0 
- (0.305) - (0.352) - -
K -1.544 1 -1.241 1 -0.964 1 
(1.932) - (8.998) - (4.4 77) -
F 0 0.12lt 0 0.282t 0 0.257t 
- (0.118) - (0.204) - (0.185) 
H -0.235t 0 -2.691 t 0 -1.195 0 
(0.586) - (11.295) - (2.099) -
PI 0.684* -0.689* 1.047 -0.934t 0.657 -0.893t 
(1.684) (0.189) (8.355) (0.143) (3.914) (0.072) 
RISK -0.007* 0.002* 4.957 0.140 2.729* -0.004t 
(0.004) (0.002) (18.152) (0.396) (3.482) (0.288) 
PI*RISK -0.499t -0.014 -0.275* O.ooot 
(1.827) (0.040) (0.345) (0.029) 
ECM(-l) 0.253 0.153* 0.034* 0.018* 0.060* 0.048* 
(0.150) (0.045) (0.013) (0.004) (0.024) (0.008) 
ECM(-l) 1.029 -0.000 0.011 0.285 -0.013 0.317* 
(0.854) (0.254) (0.056) (0.017) (0.067) (0.021) 
Table 7: Johansen estimation results with standard errors reported in brack-
ets. * denotes significance at the 5% level. t denotes variables whose ex-
clusion restriction could not be tested due to convergence problems. All 
models estimated for the period 1970 to 2005 with VAR = 1. Left-most 
model estimated with unrestricted intercepts and trends, others estimated 











Modell Model 2 
Variable CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 
y 1 -0.392* 1 -0.79lt 
- (0.423) - (0.483) 
K -1.526t 1 -1.356t 1 
(0.663) - (0.622) -
F 0 -0.553t 0 -0.322t 
- (1.293) - (0.402) 
H -0.323t 0 0.615t 0 
(0.413) - (0.491 ) -
81 0.372 -0.391 t 0.642 -1.366t 
(0.404) (0.205) (0.689) (1.019) 
PROP -0.005* 0.002 0.652t -0.144t 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.076) (0.145) 
81*PROP -0.008t 0.017t 
(0.009) (0.017) 
ECM1 0.237 0.203* 0.081 0.083* 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.119) (0.032) 
ECM2 0.236 0.069 -0.047 -0.127* 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.169) (0.045) 
Table 8: Johansen estimation results with standard errors reported in brack-
ets. * denotes significance at the 5% level. t denotes variables whose exclu-
sion restriction could not be tested due to convergence problems. All models 
estimated for the period 1970 to 2005 with VAR = 1. Left-hand model es-
timated with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends, right-hand model 
estimated with unrestricted intercepts and trends. 
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